The cultural-fight concerning “what” and “who” is valuable should come as no shock. Ethical issues such as abortion, gender-preference bathrooms, skin-color, alongside a seemingly never-ending gamut of social and ethical issues divide and press the core values of the American people. Intellectual disabilities, and the disabled at any level, are no stranger to the isolating backlash which unassumingly burdens itself upon their shoulders, due secular and Christian love affair with strength and success. The value of human life has certainly narrowed itself upon levels of elitism trademarks which comprise of what an individual may contribute toward their societal contemporaries. In this essay, authorial intent navigates briefly with the subject of human value-in light of imago dei. Unequivocally, in this age of autonomy and equality, this aims to encourage the value of every living human; embryo to geriatric. In short, let us look at two-key problems which emerge when ascribing intellectual disabilities compatible with imago dei; summarize briefly three-important Christian voices concerning these problems; and give application for the church moving forward.
IMAGO DEI: TWO-KEY PROBLEMS
One would think, here in this twenty-first century equality-driven era, the Church would whole-heartedly advocate every living person, as one created “in our [God] image, after our [God] likeness” (ESV. Gen. 1:26). Unfortunately, this is not so in many Christian circles. However, this is not perpetuated, or even sort of subconsciously perpetrated by some form of strongly-relevant position; rather, ancient ignorance (not stupidity-more likely uninformed or unaware of a greater truth at hand), thus lazily inherited in the back of the modern mind. How so? Two-key problems: (1) Convoluted interpretation of Genesis 1:26. An argument over grammar usage, searching for alternative meaning of Gen. 1:26 from tradition. (2) Highlighting scriptural-interpretation of Gen. 1:26 with philosophical reasoning bearing the question of “who” bears the image of God, based on faculties of intelligence, though fallen, which function as proof of imago dei. The former wrestles whether humankind, though created by God, really continues in imago dei; the second grapples whether the limitation of certain intellectual disabilities are true demonstration of imago dei. Summarizing Beates, Piper, and Whitt will help us navigate.
SUMMARIZING BEATES, PIPER, AND WHITT
Beates, in “Disability and the Gospel: How God Uses Our Brokenness to Display His Grace, engages the idea of imago dei displayed in humankind as abilities to reason and rationalize, thus making up one’s personality (Beates. 114, 116). This important consideration of how humankind images the image of God is no small matter. Francis Schaeffer’s consideration of personality as distinctive of humankind’s display of imago dei, alongside statements made by Carl F. H. Henry have helped shape modern Christian thinking about who can display the image of God. Henry stated, saying, “The fetus seems less than human, moreover, in cases of extreme deformity in which rational and moral capacities integral to the imago dei are clearly lacking [concerning abortion] (p. 115). And again, Henry conveys, “Can the anencephalic fetus really be considered a human person, even potentially? …To be sure, the soul is independent of the brain, and senile persons remains soulds [sic] even though their long-exorcized capacity for rational and moral distinctions is no longer apparent. But the anencephalic fetus seems by nature a mindless and amoral oddity” (p. 115). In this sense, contemporary Christianity moves onward with an ignorance; ignorance by which one does not consider the dehumanizing aspects which isolates the image of God in humankind as a depiction of personality of moral and rational capacities. This subjects those with intellectual disabilities as one’s who cannot bear the imago dei.
Piper, on “The Image of God,” contends with Barthian interpretational aspects which render all void of the imago dei. Piper, summarizes this best by quoting Leupold, writing, “As H. C. Leupold remarks, “The double modifying phrase, ‘in our image, after our likeness,’ is in the last analysis nothing more than a phrase which aims to assert with emphasis the idea that man is to be closely patterned after his Maker” (Piper, 3, 4). Barth rips asunder the idea that fallen humans may really be the imago dei, rather, upon discipleship, they “pattern” or discipline themselves after the attributes of “their maker.” To contend with this notion, Piper wrestles with the grammatical purpose of Gen. 1:26, writing, “In these texts, the English word “image” translates the Hebrew word selem; and the English “likeness” translates the Hebrew word demut except in Genesis 5:1 where “likeness” translates selem” (p. 2). Piper argues rigorously on the interchangeability of these words. Concluding against Barthian interpretation, with a more thorough argument which space here cannot provide, Piper concludes, writing, “What the full meaning of man’s God-likeness is cannot be determined until all that man and God are is known. Man as man—complex physical/spiritual being—in his wholeness, not his parts, is like God. It is not enough to say he reasons, nor is it enough to say he is addressed, for Satan, too, reasons and is addressed. Our definition of the imago Dei must be broad because the only sure statements we have about the imago are broad. The definition I offer is this: The imago Dei is that in man which constitutes him as he- whom-God-loves” (p. 16).
Whitt, in light of contentions of whether humans possess imago dei or perceived limitations of who possesses imago dei, conveys the ramifications which have been heaped upon families impacted by intellectual disabilities. Whitt says this best, summarizing, “Perhaps no other theological conviction acknowledged with the head can be known by the heart as deeply as this one when parents first hold their newborn child. Yet, when the child born is profoundly intellectually disabled, “gift” may be the very last image parents have of their child. More often than not, they experience the birth of their child with disability as a tragedy rather than a cause for celebration when they confront the reality of unrealized expectations. Christian families rarely receive messages from their churches that reshape their imaginations to receive these children as gifts. Both in theological reflection and practice, churches provide little formation for families and their fellow congregants to view these children other than as broken human beings and objects of care” (Whitt. 205). Whitt takes heart with the ramifications found in key proponents which isolate of insufficient treatment and relationship toward those with intellectual disabilities. And thus, calls the Church to embrace and celebrate those things which appear weak. Intellectual disabilities challenge the church to reckon their own less observable fallen limitations, and thus call upon the church to learn and love from the basis of these limitations (p. 209).
CONCLUSION
Interpretations of Genesis 1:26, “image” and “likeness” may appear through different perspectives as logical, however, if the interpretational application subjects certain peoples as subhuman, or incapable of bearing the image of God, especially those with intellectual disabilities, it seems incongruent with the message of the Gospel-and especially the overwhelming New Testament content which shows Jesus Christ as one who deeply cares about those with subhuman-like disabilities. Beates emphasizes this point, writing, “While we are made in God’s image, we are all weak and broken, and only in admitting and embracing that reality in ourselves and in others more overtly and existentially afflicted will we come to know most fully the liberating and transforming power of the Gospel of redemption in Jesus Christ” (p. 119). Theological and philosophical mishaps which have provided underlining justification of the mistreatment of those with intellectual disabilities, whether intended or not, have direct ramifications for the modern churches ignorance. Rarely, if ever, does one hear or read an appropriate theological or philosophical treatment toward those with disabilities. It is easy to see how a modern Gospel fueling strength through the teaching of Christian maturity and growth, alongside faulty assumptions, create an awkward uncertainty, and even tension with the disabled community. In light of this, let us engage two applicational suggestions which may help the church rightly appropriate truth and relationship toward those with disabilities.
Foremost, which could be named among many helpful subjects of discipleship in the church, a robust fostering found in a theology of weakness and suffering must be communicated. Not only must theological truth be conveyed, it must include a trajectory of discipleship which translates the word taught, into an appropriate behavioral response. This means, not only does one engage a theology of suffering for their own personal good, one must seek to operate in a grace which does not undermine change in people, yet, it must look upon those in weakness through a lens of grace and mercy. Beates, quoting Tada, elaborates, “God uses affliction like a hammer and chisel, chipping and cutting to reveal his image in you…God uses suffering to purge sin from our lives, strengthen our commitment to him, force us to depend on grace, bind us together with other believers, produce discernment, foster sensitivity, discipline our minds, spend our time wisely, stretch our hope, cause us to know Christ better, make us long for truth, lead us to repentance of sin teaches us to give thanks in times of sorrow, increase faith, and strengthen character. It is a beautiful image!... Yielding to the chisel is “learning obedience from what we suffer.” Our circumstances don’t change; we change. I cannot afford to focus on hammer and chisel… Believing in suffering is a dead end. Believing in the Sculptor is living hope” (p. 123). Theological and philosophical truths must translate into a belief and behavioral change.
Secondly, truth found in a theology of suffering should not just lead to a behavioral change toward those with intellectual disabilities, it must recognize the gifts to which these persons offer the church. Whitt conveys this well, writing, “If all are gifted, then in relationships within the congregation, all have something to offer to everyone else. In every relationship, each person enters as one who is already a recipient of God’s prior gifting. Therefore, each person is already dependent and vulnerable by nature of being human. A person does not stand solely in the position of benefactor. Everyone also needs what others have to offer. Those with disabilities are not simply objects of care upon which able-bodied Christians might learn to practice charity. Rather, they too have a purpose given by God and gifts that the community needs. Yet, these gifts can only be discovered when their bearers are embraced as human beings who share the fill humanity that is God’s gift. The discovery of what they have to share takes time, openness, and imagination in congregations to allow those with disabilities to express their gifts. If churches will do so, however, they will find themselves to be more of who God has made them to be because they are embracing all members of the body. Churches fully embrace when they believe that intellectually disabled persons have gifts for the good of the whole community-gifts that the church needs to flourish” (p. 215). In this, the community of Christ will generate the kind of love the Christian church is called to demonstrate.
Works Cited
Beates, Michael S. Disability and the Gospel: How God Uses Our Brokenness to Display His
Grace. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway, 2012. Print
ESV. English Standard Version. The Holy Bible. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway,2001. Print.
Piper, John. “The Image of God: An Approach from Biblical and Systematic Theology.”
Studia Biblica et Theologica, Document 423 (11 May 2012). Print.
Whitt, Jason D. “In the Image of God: Receiving Children with Special Needs.”
Review and Expositor, Vol. 113 (2) (2016). 205-216. Print.